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Abstract. In their pathbreaking discussions of the human family
tree in the 1860s and 1870s, Ernst Haeckel and Charles Darwin had
to account for both the ascent of the species and its diversification
into races. But what were the cause and the pattern of diversifica-
tion, and when did it begin? Did we attain a common humanity
first, which all the races still share? Or did we split up as apes and
have to find our own separate and perhaps not equivalent ways to
become human?
Using texts and images from their principal works, this paper
recovers Haeckel’s andDarwin’s views on these points, relates them
to the monogenist-polygenist debate, and compares them to Alfred
Russel Wallace’s 1864 attempt at a compromise.
Introduction
When we speak of “defining and redefining the borders between the hu-
man and the animal,” how do we picture those borders? Is there a sharp
line across a single pathway or scale of nature? Is there a broad, blurred
region? Or are we talking about an evolutionary tree rising toward the
human level? Where is the boundary in that case? Does it cut across
just one branch? Or are there several that might have made the grade, or
might yet make it?
Then, even ifwe can agree on the general arrangement of species, what
should we make of any varieties or races within species, especially those
near the border? Do the races occupydifferent levels on a scale, with some
more human than others? Or can they stand side by side on different
branches of a tree? And if the latter, where are the branching points in
relation to the animal-human border? In other words, did our ancestors
first reach the human level all together, establish a common humanity,
and only then diversify into races, relatively recently and superficially?
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Or did the races diverge first, retaining deep and ancient differences as
they ascended on separate pathways toward humanity?
Even today, reconstructions of the human family tree are scrutinized
for what they might imply about the unity of the species and the antiq-
uity of racial differences. When studies of mitochondrial DNA in the
late 1980s pointed to a relatively recent “mitochondrial Eve” who lived
in Africa, the idea was appealing, at least in part, because it minimized
racial divergence. Inspired by the mitochondrial data, the “Out-of-Africa
Hypothesis,” quickly gained support. It had modern Homo sapiens origi-
nate exclusively on that continent, disperse throughout theworld, replace
H. erectus and its offshoots everywhere, and only then diversify into geo-
graphic races.1
The main alternative, in the 1990s, was the “Multiregional Hypoth-
esis,” under which proto-humans ranged over several continents while
they were evolving intoH. sapiens. Continual movement between regions
created enough gene flow to ensure that the most important human char-
acteristics would be shared world-wide, but not too much to obliterate all
regional and racial differences, some of which might date back toH. erec-
tus. Various compromise models are currently under discussion, which
incorporate emigration of incipientH. sapiens out of Africa, but have them
interbreeding at various rates with archaic regional forms, instead of re-
placing them.
Despite the gene flow, proponents of a multiregional origin have
found themselves on the defensive against charges that they undermine
the unity of “modern humanness,”2 and against insinuations that they
give new life to nineteenth-century theories of separate origins for the
races or linear ascent of mankind.3
One fear is that any linear picture of ascent, development, or classi-
fication would have social and ethical implications, like the old scale of
nature or “great chain of being.” Eighteenth-century andLamarckian ver-
sions of the scale were based not only on morphological complexity, but
on mental progress. Higher levels added sense organs and faculties not
1. Cann, Stoneking, and Wilson 1987.
2. Wolpoff and Caspari 1997; Wolpoff, Hawks, and Caspari 2000, espe-
cially footnote 1, on 129.
3. Gould 2002, 910–914; Wolpoff and Caspari 2002.
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available at lower. Earlier versions had extended the scale upward to the
angels and the godhead.4 Hence, any attempts to arrange the human races
on a scale, even if ostensibly based on physical criteria, carry connotations
about degrees of humanness and moral advancement.
Stephen J. Gould arguedmost forcefully in his 1977Ontogeny and Phy-
logeny,5 that linear systems encouraged simplistic comparisons and rank-
ings of individuals and groups, and that they thereby lent scientific cred-
ibility to the worst forms of biologically based discrimination, including
eugenics and National Socialism.
The other fear is of polygenist anthropology, which argued that the
human races were unrelated, separate productions or creations. The ar-
gument sometimes was used to justify slavery and imperialism, under
the assumption that separately created peoples did not all have the same
moral standing or natural rights. The polygenists were engaged in a polit-
ically and ethically charged rivalry with the monogenists, who held that
the races were all descended from common human stock. There were
Biblical and biological arguments in favor of both positions.6
The biological versions drew on pre-Darwinian successional paleon-
tologies like those of Heinrich Georg Bronn in Germany or Charles Lyell
in England. The idea was to take the discontinuities in the fossil record
at face value. If a species seemed to appear suddenly at a particular time
and place, it was presumed actually to have begun its existence then and
there. How it originated was not explained, but it was presumed not to
be by transformation of previous forms of life. The new species were un-
related to the old, no matter how similar they might look.
Successional accounts were still influential right up until the publi-
cation of The Origin of Species in 1859,7 and Charles Darwin (1809–1881)
treated them as his principal rivals. Whenever he spoke of “creation,” he
was more likely to mean the paleontologist’s notion of species succession
than the Biblical version.
4. See, e.g., Lovejoy 1936; Uschmann 1939.
5. Gould 1977, 115–166.
6. For a recent overview and the case for a religious basis of American
polygenism, see Keel 2013.
7. Gliboff 2008; Rupke 2005.
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Darwinian common descent quickly superseded the successional ac-
count in paleontology, but what were its implications for mongenist-
polygenist debate in anthropology? Early Darwinians, including Dar-
win himself, his co-discoverer of natural selection, Alfred Russel Wallace
(1823–1913), and his leading German interpreter, Ernst Haeckel (1834–
1919) all addressed the problem in the 1860s and 1870s.
Committed as they were to universal common descent, they all had to
favor monogenism, but not necessarily a very recent common ancestor of
all the races. If they made that ancestor distant enough and emphasized
how far apart the races had grown, they could offer a compromise to the
polygenists and perhaps win them over to the Darwinian camp.8
These authors have been much discussed in the secondary literature,
yet there are great differences of opinion about what their views on race
even were, and it is difficult to pin them down on the twin problems of
ascent and divergence—in particular on the shape of the human family
tree, where the races branched off, and atwhat point they became human.
Haeckel andDarwin can seem at times to forget about the branching alto-
gether and to speak of scales of human progress. Yet at other times they
emphasize the diversity of the human family tree and that evolutionary
change is not always upward on a scale.
Part of the problem is their usage of the word “race,” which does not
alwaysmeanwhat modern readers expect. The sorts of groups that move
up the scale are not the same as the ones that branch off and diversify, but
are more often subgroups—ones that we would tend to think of today as
“ethnic groups.” Another part of the problem is the dearth of diagrams
from Darwin and Wallace. And another is the abundance of diagrams
from Haeckel, which are not always consistent with each other or with
the accompanying texts.
This paper analyzes the writings and (where available) the tree-
diagrams of Darwin, Haeckel, and to a lesser extent Wallace, with the
aim of clarifying and comparing their views on the origins of humans
8. This sort of compromise is discussed by Stocking 1968 and more re-
cently by Alter 2007b, who calls it “evolutionary polygenism.” For more
on nineteenth-century conceptions of race, including polygenism and
monogenism, see Stepan 1982. On the centrality of racial issues in Charles
Darwin’s intellectual development and his opposition to polygenism:
Desmond and Moore 2011; Desmond and Moore 2004
Ascent, Descent, and Divergence Gliboff, p. 5
and their races. As we shall see, Wallace took the lead in developing a
Darwinian answer to the monogenism-polygenism question in 1864, and
he compromised most with the polygenic view. He argued that the races
must have diverged at a distant, pre-human stage. Darwin opposed that
interpretation and made racial divergence more recent and superficial.
Haeckel was equivocal. On the whole, he accentuated racial divergence
more strongly than Darwin, but, by my reading of his tree diagrams, he
also allowed for more recent common ancestry of the races than didWal-
lace.9 Although they speak of progress toward the human level and of
ranks below it, all three are clearly committed to branching evolutionary
trees of primates and of human races.
Haeckel’s Phylogenetic Trees
Historians and biologists alike have been reluctant to accept Haeckel as a
proper Darwinian. There is the most doubt about Haeckel’s adherence to
the branching tree of evolution that is considered a hallmark of Darwin-
ism. By most accounts, Haeckel bowdlerized Darwin’s theory because
he was steeped in German Romantic Naturphilosophie and idealistic mor-
phology and to the linear schemes of Lamarck. He clung to archaic no-
tions of ideal types and scales of progress and perfection. Gould’s influ-
ential account depicted Haeckel’s bad Darwinism and outmoded mor-
phology as sources of Nazi racial ideology10 and contributed to a long-
running line of argument that has identified Haeckel and German Dar-
winism with Romantic and idealistic morphology and generally placed
them outside of the international mainstream.11
To the extent that they rely on the linearity of Haeckel’s evolution-
ary schemes, these accounts are very poorly supported. Aside from his
9. OnDarwin’s rejection ofWallace’s approach, seeAlter 2007b; Desmond
and Moore 2011, 341–347 & 366–368. Alter has Darwin reacting more to
Haeckel than toWallace, however, and he sees Haeckel leaningmore con-
sistently toward polygenism than I do.
10. Gould 1977, 77–78. Gould was endorsing the Haeckel-to-Hitler thesis
from Gasman 1971.
11. Bowler 1983; Breidbach 2003; Russell 1916; For an extended critique,
see Gliboff 2008, 20–24.
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general admiration for Goethe and Lamarck, little evidence is ever cited
for a linear scale in Haeckel, other than the illustration in Figure 1, from
Anthropogenie [The Evolution of Man] (1874).12 The impressive tree trunk
rising toward the Menschen [Humans] at the top surely suggests a sin-
gle main path of ascent, but just as surely, the tree does have branches.
Not all paths lead upward and not all upward paths lead to humanity.
Moreover, Haeckel repudiates the scale of nature, simplistic measures of
progress and perfection [Vervollkommnung], and any suggestion of a tele-
ological progression toward Man.
The persistence of linear scales and classification schemes in
Romantic-era and later German biology tends to be overstated. The
“Great Chain of Being” might still have had a hold on Jean-Baptiste de
Lamarck as late as 1809, but even his chain was beginning to branch by
then (see Figure 2).13 Romantic-era German morphologists were ambiva-
lent about it, at best, and experimented with various geometries and
measures of progress. If they applied the scale of nature at all, it was
only with caveats, bends, backtracks, and sometimes some branching
like Lamarck’s.
The embryologist von Baer, whom Haeckel counted as an important
forerunner of evolutionary thought, had treated linear developmental or
evolutionary schemes scornfully in 1828, “Because a unilinear metamor-
phosis, like a railroad, only allows movement upward or downward, not
to the side.”14 Such a narrow and arbitrary pathway constrained nature’s
creativity and could not do justice to the obvious diversity of life. The
paleontologist Bronn, another of Haeckel’s major pre-Darwinian author-
ities, had dispensed with it by the 1840s.15 Why would Haeckel want to
revive it in 1874? He would have been reaching way back to the eigh-
teenth century or earlier, not to just his supposed Romantic roots.
12. Haeckel 1874, Fig. XII, facing 496.
13. Lamarck 1830, 463.
14. “Weil eine einreihige Metamorphose wie eine Eisenbahn nur vorwärts oder
rückwärts gehen lässt, nicht zur Seite,” Baer 1828, 201.
15. Gliboff 2008, 61–86.
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Figure 1: Tree of human evolution from Haeckel’s Anthropogenie (1874)
with distinct main trunk.
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Figure 2: Tree diagram from Lamarck’s Philosophie Zoologique (1809).
Most animals descend from the worms, which are at the top left.
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It is a mistake to focus on the Anthropogenie tree to the exclusion of
a forest of countervailing evidence. Of course that book would feature
a tree that highlighted the line to Man—that line, and no other, was the
subject of the book. And, again, the side branches were not left out, just
trimmed short. But most important, they were clearly side branches: the
forms they represented were not depicted as stages in human evolution.
Especially toward the crown, there is extensive branching for the apes and
gibbons, and even some unlabeled lines that could be the human races,
radiating from a common ancestor close to the top.16
In the context of Haeckel’s other works, the mighty trunk of the hu-
man tree is an anomaly. All of his other trees—and he drew us many—
are as deliquescent as the one in Figure 3.17 And even within Anthropoge-
nie, more detailed diagrams display extensive branching, as in Figure 4,
which situates humans on the mammalian family tree.18
Darwin and Divergence
In Darwin’s case, too, there has been some question about the branching
pattern of human evolution. To be sure, in 1859, in The Origin he had as-
cribed great importance to what he called his principle of “divergence of
character,” which was what made branches appear on the tree of life. The
idea was that to succeed in the struggle for life, butting heads with your
competitors was not always the best strategy. There were advantages in
avoiding competition, too, for example by switching to new food sources.
Natural selection would then favor difference as well as competitive su-
periority, and in this connection, Darwin introduced the one and only
illustration in The Origin,19 shown in Figure 5.
16. For a more authoritative discussion of the proper biological interpre-
tation of this tree diagram, see Jenner, in prep., ch. 4.
17. Nat. Schöpf.-Ges. I, Plate I.
18. Haeckel 1874, 493.
19. Origin I, facing 117.
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Figure 3: Tree of animal evolution from Haeckel’s Natürliche Schöpfungs-
Geschichte (1868). Humans would be somewhere in the tuft of vertebrates
at the upper right.
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Figure 4: Tree diagram of mammalian evolution from Haeckel’s Anthro-
pogenie (1874), showing detailed branching of lineages.
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Figure 5: Tree diagram from Origin of Species (1859).
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Thanks to the horizontal dimension, Darwinian evolution is not con-
strained to going up or down on a track, but is free to go in various di-
rections, without any one of them having to be superior or even directly
comparable to any other.
But then in The Descent of Man, Darwin oddly seems to forget—at least
in the early chapters—how important that horizontal dimension had been
to him. He does not draw us any trees, neither does he enumerate the
steps in human evolution very systematically, but his language does sug-
gest a linear scale of mental and moral improvement. He describes var-
ious historical and living human subgroups as more or less “savage” or
“civilized.” For example, he observes that, “The Fuegians rank amongst
the lowest barbarians,”20 and that, “Differences. . .between the highest
men of the highest races and the lowest savages, are connected by the
finest gradations.”21
The implied scale goes from the Quadrumana (apes and monkeys)
through the “early progenitors of man”22 (who have higher mental pow-
ers than apes, but cannot really use language), then “primeval men”23
(who used stone tools and spoke), “the lowest savages”24 (who could not
count beyond four), various grades of barbarians and civilizations, and at
last to modern Christendom. In short, chapters II–V would seem at first
glance to line up the races in single file.
In the secondary literature, these chapters are often taken to repre-
sent Darwin’s view of human racial evolution in its entirety,25 but there
20. Descent, 1:34.
21. Descent, 1:35.
22. Descent, 1:56–57.
23. Descent, 52.
24. Descent, 34.
25. See, e.g., Stepan 1982, 52–66; Beasley 2010, 97–111. EvenDesmond and
Moore, who otherwise ascribe a rather egalitarian view of race to Darwin,
concede that in TheDescent he adopts a conventional linear scale onwhich
to rank the races: Desmond andMoore 2011, 364–369. An exception is Al-
ter, who recognizes that the racial hierarchy of the early chapters is not
the whole story, and in Darwin’s view not the inevitable outcome of evo-
lution: Alter 2007b.
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is much more to consider. In the later chapters,26 Darwin finally intro-
duces the horizontal axis of human evolution that enables racial diver-
gence without superiority or inferiority. But in contrast to The Origin,
divergence is caused here exclusively by sexual selection.
Natural selection was unsuitable as the driver of human racial diver-
gence, because it favored variations that were useful in the struggle for
existence (even if not always in head-to-head competition). Darwin held
that racial differences—at least the physical ones—could not be so useful:
“As far as we are able to judge (although always liable to error on this
head) not one of the external differences between the races of man are of
any direct or special service to him. . . .” Considering physical appear-
ance, at least,
Man resembles those forms, called by naturalists protean or
polymorphic, which have remained extremely variable, ow-
ing, as it seems, to their variations being of an indifferent na-
ture, and consequently to their having escaped natural selec-
tion.27
Mental and behavioral differences were, however, a different matter:
“The intellectual and moral or social faculties must of course be excepted
from this remark.”28 Changes in these kinds of traits were indeed sub-
ject to natural selection and moved the group up or down on the scale,
not sideways, hence did not account for the branching off of the races.
Conversely, the races branched off without the action of natural selection
and without changing mentally and morally. Darwin has dissociated the
physical divergence of the races from their mental and moral ascent.
Darwin used sexual selection to explain racial divergence as follows:
some ancestral populations in different geographic regions just happened
to vary slightly, maybe because of some local environmental effect, or
just by chance. No important characteristic varied, only something like
skin color, hair texture, nose shape, or limb proportions. In each re-
gion, the natives admired their own peculiarities, considered themmarks
of beauty, and selected mates accordingly. In Africa, for example, the
darker-skinned beauties had greater success at mating and reproduction;
26. Descent, especially ch. 19.
27. Descent, 1:248–249.
28. Descent, 1:249.
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in Europe, the bright, pink ones were preferred. Over many generations
these mating preferences perpetuated, accentuated, and spread the orig-
inal regional characteristic.
If one had not read about the scale of ascent at the beginning of The
Descent, one might see in sexual selection the basis for a very egalitarian
account of racial divergence. The horizontal dimension that it opens up
makes room for a tree with the races side by side on different branches,
with the differences being only matters of taste.
In order to reconcile the two parts of the book, it is important to make
a distinction between races and Races. The big ones—e.g., Negroid, Cau-
casoid, Mongoloid—diverged in Darwin’s account by sexual selection,
and their differences were physical, non-adaptive, and “sideways” on the
scale of nature. At the point in time when they began to diverge, they
were at the same level: they were human already, either “primeval men,”
or maybe “savages.” Darwin had the big Racial classifications becoming
established without reference to mental or moral superiority.
In contrast, the “races” that rise up the scale in the earlier chapters are
subgroups, more like modern “ethnic groups.” Darwin does not even re-
fer to them consistently as races. When describing hypothetical pathways
of struggle and ascent, Darwin is just as likely to pit “tribes”29 against
one another. Or when discussing concrete examples such as the Irish and
the Scots, Frenchmen, Esquimaux, Fuegians, Hottentots, or Tahitians, he
tends to call them “nations.”30
These subgroups ascend independently of the rest of their Races to a
variety of heights, for a variety of reasons: “It is, however, very difficult
to form any judgment why one particular tribe and not another has been
successful and has risen in the scale of civilisation.”31 On the whole, it
seemed to be because of local circumstances and customs:
Progress seems to depend on many concurrent favourable
conditions, far too complex to be followed out. But it has of-
ten been remarked, that a cool climate from leading to indus-
try and the various arts has been highly favourable, or even
indispensable for this end. The Esquimaux, pressed by hard
29. Descent, 1:159–167.
30. Descent, 1:167–184.
31. Descent, 1:166.
Ascent, Descent, and Divergence Gliboff, p. 16
necessity, have succeeded in many ingenious inventions, but
their climate has been too severe for continued progress. No-
madic habits, whether over wide plains, or through the dense
forests of the tropics, or along the shores of the sea, have in
every case been highly detrimental. Whilst observing the bar-
barous inhabitants of Tierra del Fuego, it struck me that the
possession of some property, a fixed abode, and the union of
many families under a chief, were the indispensable requisites
for civilisation.
Luck could also be a factor:
Such habits almost necessitate the cultivation of the ground;
and the first steps in cultivation would probably result, as I
have elsewhere shewn, from some such accident as the seeds
of a fruit-tree falling on a heap of refuse and producing an
unusually fine variety.32
In any case, Darwin nowhere suggested that tribes or nations as-
cended (or failed to do so) because of their color or anything else about
their ancestral stock or Race. Subgroups of every Race could be found at
many different levels. One could not assess a subgroup’s mental or moral
level just by looking at them.
Darwin provided no tree diagram of the races, but I would like to sug-
gest that he approved of Haeckel’s picture in the Natürliche Schöpfungs-
Geschichte of 1868, which Darwin praised effusively in The Descent. There,
Haeckel arranged the races in a bushy tree, and placed subgroups of each
of the great Races at various heights on the scale.
Haeckel on Racial Diversification
Two major differences between Darwin and Haeckel should be noted,
however. First, even though Darwin sangHaeckel’s praises for appreciat-
ing the “full importance”33 of sexual selection, one place where Haeckel
did not invoke that form of selection was in his account of human racial
32. Descent, 1:167.
33. Descent, 1:4.
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divergence. He had the races diverging for other reasons, such as envi-
ronmental effects, natural selection, and correlations that might allow in-
significant characteristics to ride the coattails of more advantageous ones.
This is consistent in all the editions of Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte,
even those that came out after Darwin’s Descent. So divergence, for
Haeckel, did have survival value and could result in the superiority of
one branch of the human tree over another.
Second, Haeckel usually referred to themajor Races as “species,” with
subdivisions into subspecies and variants [Menschenarten, Unterarten, and
Abarten]. Even though Haeckel noted that Darwin had rendered the dis-
tinction between species and races or varieties blurry and unimportant,
his terminology accentuated the differences much more strongly than
Darwin’s. This was one way in which Haeckel reached out to the poly-
genist anthropologists, who preferred the species-level classification.
These differences notwithstanding, I think Haeckel’s diagrams still
capture the general pattern that Darwin had inmind. Consider Haeckel’s
first attempt at a family tree of the human races, from the first edition of
Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte (1868),34 shown in Figure 6. It depicts a
richly branching and diverse family, with the various groups rising to dif-
ferent levels of mental, social, or cultural attainment. The horizontal di-
mension is unmistakable. There is plenty of room to be different without
being inferior.
Although they overlap, the range of heights reached by the colored
races is lower than the whiter ones, so the system does reflect conven-
tional racial prejudices. But there are also some surprising equalities, es-
pecially near the top, where we find Berbers and Jews joining the Ger-
mans.
The illustrations also capture some of the dynamism that I think Dar-
win, too, envisioned. There is considerablemovement of racial groups be-
tween editions of the book. As Robert J. Richards has argued, thesemove-
ments invite interpretation as illustrations of how Haeckel perceived hu-
man cultural and perhaps also biological progress during his own life-
time.35 On that view, Haeckel’s racial classification system is only a snap-
34. Nat. Schöpf.-Ges. I, Plate VIII.
35. Richards 2008, 244–55.
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Figure 6: Family tree of the human races, from Haeckel’s Natürliche
Schöpfungs-Geschichte (1868).
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shot of a living tree, on which the inferior groups are not stuck perma-
nently at the lower levels, but have the potential for growing upward.
So when Darwin says in 1871 (and later) that he agrees with Haeckel
on human evolution,36 that indeed he would not even have attempted
to write The Descent if Haeckel’s Natürliche Schöpfungs-Geschichte had
appeared any sooner, he must be satisfied with the way Haeckel cap-
tured the general pattern and the dialectical interactions of ascent and
divergence—or at least he preferred to sidewithHaeckel rather thanWal-
lace.
Where the Races Branch Off
In a paper presented to the Anthropological Society in 1864, Wallace had
argued that once our ancestors reached the human level, the effects of nat-
ural selection on their bodies would have to be greatly diminished. Full-
fledged humans would respond to environmental or competitive chal-
lenges by changing their clothing, housing, tools, or social organization.37
Most bodily variations would be immaterial for survival.
But if humans were no longer evolving much physically, how could
they possibly differentiate into races? Wallace reasoned that racial differ-
ences must date from a much older period, when physical variation still
was important. It was a time when Man was not fully human and
had not yet acquired that wonderfully developed brain. . . ,
when he had the form but hardly the nature of man, when he
neither possessed human speech, nor those sympathetic and
moral feelings which in a greater or less degree everywhere
now distinguish the race.
Ascent was still possible for the separate races, then as now, because nat-
ural selection always favored mental and moral characteristics such as
Capacity for acting in concert, for protection and for the acqui-
sition of food and shelter; sympathy, which leads all in turn to
36. Descent, 1:4.
37. Wallace 1864, especially 162–166.
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assist each other; the sense of right, which checks depreda-
tions upon our fellows; the decrease of the combative and de-
structive propensities; self-restraint in present appetites. . . .38
Our ape-level ancestors, then, must already have split up into races, and
each race must have developed these mental and moral qualities, and be-
come fully human, in its own way.
Darwin disagreed. He wrote in The Descent, referring to Man as a
species, that “since he attained to the rank of manhood, he has diverged
into distinct races” and that the common ancestor of all the races “would
probably have deserved to rank as man.”39
Haeckel is more difficult to pin down on this point. Was the last com-
mon ancestor of all the races still a man-ape [Menschenaffe] or already an
ape-man [Affenmensch]? Could it speak? That would bemore or less deci-
sive, because Haeckel counted the acquisition of language as a most im-
portant last step in becoming human. Or, if it could not speak, was it
already differentiated into separate races that would each invent speech
and become human independently?
At least in his later works, Haeckel identified this last pre- or proto-
human ancestor as the hypothetical Pithecanthropus alalus or “ape-man
without speech” (Figure 7). After the discovery of Java Man, or Pithecan-
thropus erectus (now classified as Homo erectus erectus), was reported in
1894, Haeckel bragged that he had come very close to anticipating the
real thing, the real missing link.40
But Haeckel was inconsistent in how he classified this last non-
speaking ancestor. Sometimes he gave it the formal Linnaean binomial of
the distinct genus and species Pithecanthropus alalus, sometimes he used
only the generic Pithecanthropus, sometimes just Alalus as if it were itself
a distinct genus, and sometimes he used only the vernacular Urmensch
[primeval man] or Affenmensch [ape-man]. Thus he left himself some
room for reinterpretation, while also suggesting a level that is human in
most ways, just not in the use of language.
38. Wallace 1864, 162.
39. Descent, 2:388, emphasis added.
40. Haeckel 1898, 715–716.
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Figure 7: Artist’s conception of Pithecanthropus alalus, from Natürliche
Schöpfungs-Geschichte (1898), plate XIX, between 104 and 105. Based on
an 1894 painting by Gabriel Max.
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Let us look again at the tree diagrams to see if they offer further clarifi-
cation. In 1868 (Figure 6), the base of the tree is labeled “Urmensch oder Af-
fenmensch, entstanden aus Menschenaffen” [Primeval man or ape-man, orig-
inating from the anthropoid apes]. Clearly this is a notch above the an-
thropoid apes, but we are given the choice of whether to emphasize its
humanity and call it an Urmensch or its intermediacy and call it an Affen-
mensch.
Another diagram from the 1868 edition shows the transition from the
apes in a littlemore detail (Figure 8).41 Here, aswe approach the top of the
tree, that advanced, but still a-lingual stage is identified as “Sprachloser
Mensch Alalus oder Affenmensch Pithecanthropus.” Again we are given
a choice of terms, but the contrast is stronger than in the racial tree of
Figure 6, since the first is no longer an Urmensch, but aMensch, albeit still
qualified as sprachlos [speechless]. The addition of zoological Latin names
suggests a difference at the genus-level, with Alalus apparently higher
than Pithecanthropus.
In any case, in Haeckel’s depiction, the races do not branch out di-
rectly at this pre-human level, as Wallace would have had it. Instead, the
line continues upward to the stage of the “Sprechender Mensch Homo,”
which is clearly supposed to be human, since it speaks and is placed
in the human genus. Only then, after establishing their common hu-
manity and common membership in the genus Homo, do the two main
racial groups—the wooly-haired and the straight-haired—diverge. This
is Haeckel’s most egalitarian picture of the human tree.
The diagram by itself would putHaeckel in close agreementwith Dar-
win, but the accompanying text hews a bit more towardWallace. Follow-
ing the historical linguist August Schleicher, Haeckel argues there that
the main human language groups were ultimately unrelated and did not
have a common origin in a singleUrsprache. Hence, if it could be assumed
that racial evolution ran parallel to language evolution, that single “Spre-
chender Mensch Homo” stage at the base of the human part of the tree
might not actually have existed. The transition to the speaking stage and
to humanity would then have occurred several separate times, giving rise
each time to a distinct race and language family.
Haeckel writes:
41. Nat. Schöpf.-Ges. I, 493.
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Figure 8: Family tree of apes and men, from Haeckel’s Natürliche
Schöpfungs-Geschichte (1868).
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Human speech as such probably developed only after the
genus of speechless primeval men or ape-men split up into
several species. In each of these human species, and maybe
even in various subspecies and variants of these species,
speech developed on its own and independently of the oth-
ers.42
On the other hand, Haeckel knew itwas unsafe to rely on the linguistic
evidence:
As is well known, the boundaries of these language families
correspond in no way with the boundaries of the various hu-
man species or so-called “races.” In this lies most eminently
the great difficulty presented by the further pursuit of the hu-
man family tree into its individual branches, the species, races,
variants, etc.43
The text leaves us with greater ambiguity than the diagram. It does not
refer to any undifferentiated “Sprechender MenschHomo” as the common
ancestor of all the races. The races appear instead to have begun diverging
at some quasi-human stage, but Haeckel does not specify whether it is
already the Urmensch or still the Affenmensch.
In the 1870 edition (Figure 9),44 Haeckel deepens the racial differences
by deleting the “sprechender Mensch” stage from the diagram and having
the races branch off directly from the “Sprachlose Menschen (Alali) oder Af-
fenmenschen (Pithecanthropi).” The revision brings the diagram into bet-
42. “Die menschliche Sprache als solche entwickelte sich wahrscheinlich erst,
nachdem die Gattung des sprachlosen Urmenschen oder Affenmenschen in meh-
rere Arten oder Species auseinander gegangen war. Bei jeder von diesen Men-
schenarten, und vielleicht selbst bei verschiedenenUnterarten undAbarten dieser
Species, entwickelte sich die Sprache selbstständig und unabhängig von einan-
der,” Nat. Schöpf.-Ges. I, 510.
43. “Bekanntlich entsprechen aber die Grenzen dieser Sprachstämme keineswegs
den Grenzen der verschiedenen Menschenarten oder sogenannten ‘Rassen,’ und
hierin vorzüglich liegt die große Schwierigkeit, welche die weitere Verfolgung
des menschlichen Stammbaums in seine einzelnen Zweige, die Arten, Rassen,
Abarten u.s.w, darbietet,” Nat. Schöpf.-Ges. I, 510–511.
44. Haeckel 1870, 571.
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Figure 9: Family tree of apes and men, from Haeckel’s Natürliche
Schöpfungs-Geschichte (1870).
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ter alignment with the (still ambiguous) text, where each of the nascent
races acquires language on its own. There is no common Ursprache and
perhaps no human-level common ancestor of the races, depending on
how one prefers to classify that last unspeaking stage. Subsequent edi-
tions retain the same picture.
Darwin, too, had been intrigued by the analogy between biological
and linguistic evolution, but he argued firmly against relying on it as a
guide to genealogy and classification, and he refrained more consistently
than Haeckel from using it. Just because the linguists could find no trace
of a primeval common language, he warned, one should not jump to the
conclusion that there really never was one:
From the fundamental differences between certain languages,
some philologists have inferred that when man first became
widely diffused he was not a speaking animal; but it may
be suspected that languages, far less perfect than any now
spoken, aided by gestures, might have been used, and yet
have left no traces on subsequent and more highly-developed
tongues.45
In Darwin’s view, those linguists had the sequence of evolutionary
events all wrong. No lineage was likely to differentiate into races un-
til it was successful enough to become dominant and “widely diffused”
geographically. And in the case of humans, that kind of success could
only come after the advent of language. This was not only because of
the adaptive value of language—its utility for communication and social
organization—but also because of the way language would stimulate fur-
ther mental evolution: “Without the use of some language, however im-
perfect, it appears doubtful whether man’s intellect could have risen to
the standard implied by his dominant position at an early period.”46 In
short, according to Darwin, language had to come first, before there were
races. A unified species acquired speech, attained the human level, suc-
ceeded, multiplied, spread, and only then diversified into races.
45. Descent, 1:235.
46. Descent, 1:235; Alter 2008; for a more thorough comparison of
Haeckel’s and Darwin’s uses of linguistics, see Alter 2007a.
Conclusion
For a Darwinian evolutionist, then, the border region between animals
and humans is a wide one, and it is traversed gradually by a family tree
that allows for both ascent and divergence. This holds for Haeckel as
much as for Darwin himself. Both rejected a linear scale of ascent. Both
allowed for tribes, nations, or the smaller “racial” groupings to progress
or regress independently and to reach a variety of levels within anymajor
Race.
As proponents of common descent, both had to reject polygenism in
favor of monogenism, but they differed in how far back they would place
the last common ancestor of all the races and whether they would count
it as already human. Haeckel was more willing than Darwin to reach
out to the polygenists by making the linguistic and biological differences
between the races into longer-standing ones. Still, not even he fully en-
dorsed Wallace’s compromise proposal. Especially in his family trees,
Haeckel did not have the races diverging from one another until a point
very close to (or perhaps even at) the fully human level. Of the three, only
Wallace clearly gave the races an earlier pre-human origin and required
each to find its own path upward.
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